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US Civil War data allow examinations of theories of leadership. By observing
both leaders and followers during thewar and 40 years after it, I establish that the
most able became wartime leaders, that leading by example from the front was
an effective strategy in reducing desertion rates, and that leaders later migrated
to the larger cities because this is where their superior skills would have had the
highest payoffs. I find mixed evidence on whether leaders were created or born.
I find that US cities were magnets for the most able and provided training
opportunities for both leaders and followers: Men might start in a low social
status occupation in a city but then move to a higher status occupation.
(JEL M50, N31)
They were the leaders of men, these great ones . . .
Carlyle (1840: 3)
A favorite quotation of the many websites devoted to leadership is “Real
leaders are ordinary men with extraordinary determination.”1 Prior gen-
erations celebrated both the superior cognitive and noncognitive skills of
leaders. Carlyle (1840: 3) wrote of “Great Men.” Galton (1869: 141), in
discussing military leaders, wrote of men “excelling in many particulars,”
including energy, political capacity, charisma, intellect, and will. A hier-
archical organization such as the military or a firm should assign the “real
leaders” to the highest ranking positions so that their reach is stretched
over a larger reach of the organization’s activities (Rosen 1992). But, as
Galton (1869: 143) recognized, the incentives may not always be there. In
times of peace or during short wars, political patronage may determine
military positions. A firm with monopoly power may dissipate its rents on
poor managers. The difficulty facing researchers on leadership is that it is
hard to identify the real leaders—noncognitive skills are hard to measure
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and an observed leader may not necessarily have achieved his position
through superior skills.
This article uses data on Union Army soldiers to investigate theories of
leadership. It examines the characteristics of men who were promoted to
leadership positions and looks at what made leaders effective. It examines
whether, after the war, leaders are found in the larger cities where their
superior decision-making skills would have had the highest payoff. I can
thus determine whether in the American past cities were magnets for the
skilled as they are today (Gould 2007). Because the US Civil War was a
prolonged war with civilians (largely self-taught) filling the ranks of com-
missioned and noncommissioned officers, it provides a unique opportunity
to identify the real leaders. Because all records are in the public domain
(unlike WWII records) and because I follow men for 40 years, I can de-
termine whether wartime leaders became civilian leaders and where they
move after the war. By predicting who would have become a leader even
with no regimental casualties and who became a leader only with regimen-
tal casualties, I findmixed evidence on whether leaders are born or created.
A vast literature examines the traits of who becomes a leader, describes
leadership styles, analyzes what makes leaders effective, and models the
matching of leaders and organizations. Traits that distinguish leaders
from others include physical energy, intelligence (including social intelli-
gence) greater than that of the average follower, motivation, self-confi-
dence, and flexibility (House and Aditya 1997). Although an emphasis on
personality characteristics suggests that leadership is innate, if leaders are
judges, experts, and coordinators (Hermalin 2013) or simply people who
make right decisions more often (Lazear 2010), leadership can be learned.
Game theoretic models of leader effectiveness have emphasized that one
way to elicit effort from followers is to lead by example (Hermalin 2013).
The density and range of Civil War firearms made exposure suicidal and
the leadership skills of great generals evolved with the technology, no
longer centering on leading charges or needless exposure to the line of
fire (Keegan 1987: 164–234). Nonetheless, Civil War scholars have empha-
sized the importance of both noncommissioned and commissioned officers
such as colonels or captains motivating troops by showing courage under
flying bullets (Linderman 1987: 44–45; McPherson 2007: 145–54).
Scholars have pointed out that US officers’ not sharing the danger in
WWII became a cause for resentment (Linderman 1999: 197) and may
have reduced the US Army’s tactical proficiency relative to the
Wehrmacht (Muth 2011).
Models of sorting explain the observed characteristics of leaders and
their organizations. In Lucas’s (1978) model, the largest firms have the
best managers because as capital increases wages rise relative to marginal
managerial returns thus inducing marginal managers to become em-
ployees. Rosen (1982) showed that the more talented will sort to top pos-
itions in larger firms where their greater talent filters through the entire
firm through the recursive chain of command. Lazear (2010) emphasizes
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not firm size but that the better leaders will sort to the highest variance
industries because this is where decision making has the highest payoff.
After the US Civil War, decision making should have had the highest
payoff in the larger cities that offered greater diversity in manufacturing
industries (the dominant economic activity) and higher wages (Kim 2006).
1. Officers in the Civil War
Regiments, the basic unit of the Civil War Armies, were formed locally.
The volunteer infantry regiments consisted of 10 companies, each contain-
ing roughly 100 men, commanded by a captain and two lieutenants. Each
company had four sergeants, one of whom served as company first ser-
geant, a sergeant major, a quartermaster sergeant, a commissary sergeant,
four corporals, a hospital steward, two musicians, and one wagoneer. The
noncommissioned officers included corporals and sergeants, and the com-
missioned officers were ranks of lieutenant and higher. The commissioned
officers were often volunteer officers drawn from state militias, men of
political significance, or other prominent men in the community.
Sometimes the enlisted men elected their own officers. Generally, state
governors appointed the commissioned officers and the commissioned
officers selected the noncommissioned officers. After the first major bat-
tles, state governors began to commission officers from the ranks of non-
commissioned officers who had proved themselves in the field and in battle
(Fisher, Jr. 1994: 109). Among Ohio companies, the major predictors of
promotion to noncommissioned officer were a nonfarm and nonlaborer
occupation and literacy (Lee 1999).
Commissioned and noncommissioned officers performed all five of the
leadership activities defined by Hermalin (2013): they served as judges,
experts, coordinators, symbols, and shapers of preferences. Officers had to
judge men for absences without leave, crimes, and desertion; they had to
become experts in military tactics (both commissioned and noncommis-
sioned officers would take lessons nightly studying from various training
manuals); they had to ensure that their men had adequate supplies, they
had to file reports, and in the field they had to maintain unit direction and
cadence and see to it that the men fired upon order; the regimental color
bearer (a sergeant) was the rallying point for the men in the regiment (and
the regimental flag enabled regimental and division officers to see where a
regiment was in a battle); and the colonel was supposed to have “a per-
sonal acquaintance with every officer and man” (Sherman 1891: 385).
Officer positions required not just technical skills but also people skills.
Samuel Pryce whose longest war service was as the regimental adjunct
wrote, “The details made by the sergeant major, the distribution of cloth-
ing by the Q-M sergeant, and the dispensation of food by the commissary
sergeant were positions requiring the highest skill and tact, to avoid com-
plaints” (Pryce 2008: 32).
Leaders and Followers in US Civil War 439
Officers could not expect to enforce their will on their men. Men who
elected their own officers could just as easily dismiss them. Officers who
commanded contempt because of their cowardice or disregard for the
welfare of their men resigned their commissions, driven out by their
men’s ill will. When John Beatty, lieutenant colonel of the Third Ohio,
began to court-martial men who left camp without leave, he faced “not
only the hatred and curses of the soldiers tried and punished but in some
instances the ill will of their fathers, who for years were my neighbors and
friends.” He only aggravated insubordination as men extended their ab-
sences, refused to drill, and signed petitions demanding his resignation
(Linderman 1987: 41). He later gained the regiment’s respect when at
Perryville he ordered his men to the ground while he remained standing
under “shot, shell, and canister . . . thick as hail” (Linderman 1987: 44–45).
Sergeants and commissioned officers were paid more than enlisted men
and lived in different quarters in the same camp (Smith 2003). At the start
of the war infantry privates and corporals were paid $13 a month, ser-
geants $17, first sergeants $20, and lieutenants and captains over $100
(Boatner 1991: 624). Privates in an army camp were grouped by company.
There were separate rows for the noncommissioned officers, commis-
sioned officers of the companies, and the staff and commander of the
regiment, who were located in front of the baggage train. Officers used
their own funds to purchase food and ate at separate messes from the men.
The latrines for officers were behind the baggage train, whereas those for
enlisted men were at the opposite end of the camp. Smith (2003) finds
disease death rates of 65.4 per 1000 for enlisted men in New York
Regiments compared to 23 per thousand for their commissioned officers.
Lee (1999) finds that in a sample of Ohio companies 4% of noncommis-
sioned officers died of disease compared to 9% of privates.
The ranks of enlisted Union Army infantrymen (excluding the men who
entered as commissioned officers and are not in my sample) were more
likely to include artisans and the foreign-born and were less likely to in-
clude professionals and proprietors compared to age-eligible northern
white men in 1860. They were also more likely than the general population
to be from pro-Lincoln counties. However, the sample is representative in
terms of wealth and literacy rates (Costa and Kahn 2008: 36, 52). Perhaps
professionals and proprietors and the native-born were more likely to
serve in the artillery or cavalry or as commissioned officers. Service
rates during the Civil War were high. Roughly 65–98% of the cohorts
born between 1838 and 1845 were examined for military service and
48–81% of these cohorts served; the remainder were rejected for poor
health (Costa and Kahn 2008: 36).
2. Economic Framework
The military is an internal labor market with few ports of entry and with
promotion largely from within (Rosen 1992). In a strongly hierarchical
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organization with a chain of command structure, it is efficient to assign the
most able individuals to the highest ranking and most influential positions
in the organization because their reach is stretched over a larger portion of
the organization’s activities. Selection of personnel to the highest ranks is
thus more important than selection to the lower ranks. Because talent is
revealed only slowly and because advancement depends on the number of
available positions, the promotion mechanism is an elimination tourna-
ment. The reward for any given rank is the weighted sum of rewards
attained at all ranks higher than the current rank, with weights depending
on the conditional probability of surviving to compete at those higher
levels. Because competition is tougher at each step, the earnings structure
has to give more than proportionally greater awards to those who achieve
higher rank. The jump in earnings between the $20 per month earned by
first sergeant and the more than $100 earned by a lieutenant is consistent
with a tournament model.
Both commissioned and noncommissioned officers should have been
more skilled than privates prior to joining the army and the more skilled
should achieve higher ranks. Promotion should depend on the demand for
officers which will in turn depend on how much action the regiment saw.
Both officers and noncommissioned officers should have more privileges
than enlisted men. Because these privileges meant different food and sep-
arate quarters and because of the strong relationship between sanitation
and disease in the 19th century, officers should face a lower probability of
death from disease. Unless monetary compensation was very high, they
should also face a lower overall risk of death. The compensation differ-
ential between privates and both commissioned and noncommissioned
officers is thus even starker than suggested by the pay scale.
Officers might lead by example to signal to their followers that victory is
achievable or that the risk of death is not high. Hermalin (2013) shows that
in a game theoretic model in which the leader’s actions reveal the true
state of nature to the follower, the harder the leader works the harder the
followers work. If the leader’s actions do not fully reveal the state and their
payoff depends on the efforts of other teammembers, followers will mimic
the leader whereas they would not if they knew the true state (Komai et al.
2007). With perfect mimicry, the battlefield mortality of officers and pri-
vates will be similar, though going first will increase mortality. The
noncommissioned officers who were regimental flag-bearers should have
a higher mortality rate than privates because they were good targets.
Officers’ battlefield mortality could be lower or higher than that of enlisted
men if, on average, men do not follow or officers do not lead by example.
Leading by example can be efficient (see the review by Hermalin 2013).
If it is an effective strategy, then desertion rates (which averaged 10% for
theUnion Army) should be lower for companies where a higher fraction of
officers relative to enlisted men were killed controlling for the death rate.
How successfully military training can be transferred to the civilian
sector remains an open question. Military training could develop skills
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such as discipline or leadership. It could also have provided familiarity
with logistics. Descriptions of the strengths of Grant’s leadership and the
management of the modern firm are similar.2 Although military service
on average has a negative causal effect on earnings (Angrist 1990),
E. Benmelech and C. Frydman (2012) find that military service has a
causal effect on managerial decisions and firm outcomes. Even if military
training has no effect on later outcomes, if military leaders are the most
able they will become the civilian leaders.
The most able (those who become officers) should sort to where their
abilities have the greatest payoffs. Thus they will be in larger cities, which
may have fostered the division of labor, and in higher status occupations
after the war. Lee (2007) finds that former noncommissioned and com-
missioned officers were more likely to move upward in status to a white-
collar occupation by 1880 than privates, but did not look at where men
migrated. Moving to a large city may have opened up opportunities even
for men who had to start in lower status occupations. If the more able
leaders are also generalists (Lazear 2010), then the officers who had dif-
ferent types of duties during the war will be more likely to be in larger cities
than those who had only type of duty.
3. Econometric Framework
I examine whether officers were more able by looking at the predictors of
time in months from muster until first promotion to commissioned officer,
sergeant, and corporal. That is, I estimate a Weibull hazard model of the
form
hðtÞ ¼ h0ðtÞ expðxðXÞ ð1Þ
where h0ðtÞ is the baseline hazard and X is a vector of characteristics
including height, personal property ownership in 1860, literacy in 1860,
marital status in 1860, nativity, occupation at enlistment (professional
or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the
omitted category), dummies for enlistment year, age at muster, volunteer
status, the logarithm of population in city of enlistment, and whether
the regiment was in the past under fire, a measure of promotion
possibilities.
I estimate the effectiveness of leading from the front by estimating OLS
regressions of the form
2. Grant used the telegraph “to collect intelligence, summon reinforcements, rapidly
redispose [their] forces, and co-ordinate the movement of widely separated formations.”
“He valued objective information highly and collected it from many sources . . . Rivers and
railroads were the means by which Grant brought his armies to the battlefield, spies, scouts
and telegraph the media through which he informed himself of the enemy’s own movements”
(Keegan 1987: 210–21). Grant was not able to transfer his skills to the private sector andwas a
notoriously bad business man.
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Company Desertion Rate ¼ r
No of officers killed+ :01
No of men killed+ :01

+
dðCompany Death Rate in BattleÞ+
oðCompany CharacteristicsÞ+ u
ð2Þ
where each observation is a company, the ratio of commissioned officers
to enlisted men killed in battle is on the regiment level, and company
characteristics include the fraction of the company who were volunteers,
the coefficient of variation of age for the company, company occupational
fragmentation, birth place fragmentation, and the mean 1860 percent vote
for Lincoln in the county of enlistment.3
I examine the effects of having been an officer on city of residence in
both 1880 and 1900 by estimating probit equations for each year of the
form
PrðC ¼ 1Þ ¼ ðcCorporal+ sSergeant
+oðCommissioned OfficerÞ+ aXÞ
ð3Þ
PrðC ¼ 1Þ ¼ ðsoðSergeant or Commissioned OfficerÞ+xXÞ ð4Þ
and ordered probit equations of the form
PrðCS ¼ iÞ ¼ Prði1 < soðSergeant or Commissioned OfficerÞ
+xX < iÞ
ð5Þ
where C is equal to one if the veteran lived in a city of at least 25,000
people in 1880 or 1900, CS is a categorical variable with city size categories
of 250,000 or more, 2500–24,999, and less than 2500 or unincorporated in
1900, and k is the cut point. (I combine sergeants with commissioned
officers in a single category because, as I will later show, there was no
statistically significant difference between them in later outcomes.) X is a
vector of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, including
height at enlistment, personal property ownership in 1860, literacy in
3. To estimate birth place I calculated, by company, the fraction of individuals born in the
United States in New England, in theMiddle Atlantic, in the East North Central, in theWest
North Central, the Border states, the south, and the west and born abroad in Germany,
Ireland, Canada, Great Britain, Scandinavia, northwestern Europe (France, Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands), other areas of Europe, and other areas of the world. The
birthplace fragmentation index, fi, is then
fi ¼ 1
X
k
s2ki,
where k represents the categories and where ski is the share of men born in place k in company
i. To estimate occupational fragmentation I calculated, by company, the fraction of individ-
uals who were farmers, higher class professionals and proprietors, lower class professionals
and proprietors, artisans, higher class laborers, lower class laborers, and unknown. The
occupational fragmentation index is then calculated similarly to the birthplace fragmentation
index.
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1860, marital status in 1860, nativity, occupation at enlistment (profes-
sional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the
omitted category), dummies for enlistment year, age at muster, volunteer
status, dummies for population size in city of enlistment, and dummies for
1880 occupation in the 1900 specification. I include 1880 occupation in the
1900 regression because some occupations, such as farmer, are not city
occupations and to test whether controlling for occupation leaders are
more likely to move to larger cities. If officers are the most able, whether
innately or because of what they have learned on the job, they should
move to a larger city. My estimated coefficients on rank may in part
measure unobserved human and community social capital and thus
overestimate the effects of leadership skills. Although I can control for
literacy, property ownership, and occupation, these may be poor measures
of human and social capital for the young.
I similarly measure the effects of having been an officer on later life
socioeconomic outcomes by estimating probit equations of the form
PrðS ¼ 1Þ ¼ ðcCorporal+sSergeant+oðCommissioned OfficerÞ
+aXÞ
ð6Þ
PrðS ¼ 1Þ ¼ ðsoðSergeant or Commissioned OfficerÞ+xXÞ ð7Þ
where S is variously an indicator of whether the veteran was a professional
or proprietor circa 1900, a home owner in 1900, and a professional or
proprietor in 1880.
I can obtain suggestive evidence on whether officer effects are due to the
selection of who became an officer or the treatment effects of being an
officer by classifying the combined category of sergeants and commis-
sioned officers into those who would have been promoted before the
end of the war with no deaths of commanding officers and those who
were promoted because of deaths of commanding officers. My classifica-
tion is based on predictions obtained from equation 1. Men who would
have been promoted even without regimental casualties were arguably the
born leaders, whereas those who were promoted only with regimental with
regimental casualties either learned to be leaders or had to prove their
worth with wartime heroics. I then estimate probit equations of the form
PrðV ¼ 1Þ ¼ ðso1ðSergeant or Commissioned Officer, Promoted with deathsÞ
+so2ðSergeant or Commissioned Officer, Promoted without deathsÞ+xXÞ
ð8Þ
where V is variously an indicator of whether the veteran was in a city of at
least 25,000 in 1880 or 1900 and whether the veteran was a professional or
proprietor in 1880 or circa 1900. If so2 > so1, then leaders are born.
If s01 ¼ s02, then leaders are created.
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I also examine whether men who had been sergeants or commissioned
officers and had a greater number of duties were more likely to be in a city
of 25,000 or more in 1880 or 1900 compared to men with fewer duties.
Men with more tasks are arguably greater generalists. I estimate probit
equations of the form
PrðC ¼ 1Þ ¼ ðso1ðSergeant or Commissioned Officer, one taskÞ+
so2ðSergeant or Commissioned Officer, more than one taskÞ+ xXÞ
ð9Þ
PrðC¼ 1Þ ¼ðso1ðSergeant or Commissioned Officer, one taskÞ+
so2ðSergeant or Commissioned Officer, two tasksÞ+
so3ðSergeant or Commissioned Officer, more than two tasksÞ+xXÞ
ð10Þ
where C is an indicator equal to one if population in the city of residence
was more than 25,000. Because pay was determined by rank and not by
the number of tasks, if s02 > s01 I can rule out the hypothesis that offi-
cers moved to cities and became professionals and proprietors because
their army pay provided them the means to do so.
4. Data
My sample is based on the army records of roughly 35,000 white men in
303 volunteer infantry Union Army regiment.4 These records provide
basic socioeconomic and demographic information at enlistment and
record muster-in and muster-out information, promotions and demo-
tions, furloughs, AWOLs, desertions, captures, wounds, illnesses, and
death. Information on the 1860 population of incorporated place of en-
listment was added. Military records were collected for all enlisted men
within one of the randomly chosen companies. The commissioned officers
in the sample are therefore predominately those who rose from the ranks.
I added information whether the regiment was under fire in a specific
month from the regimental histories collected as part of this project.
After the military records were entered into the database, pension re-
cords, including detailed physical examinations, were collected. The pen-
sion records provide information on occupation, names of family
members, and death. The information in the pension records and the
army records is then used to link recruits to the 1850, 1860, 1900, and
1910 censuses. Linkage to the 1860 census indicates that the sample is
representative not just of the Union Army but also of the northern popu-
lation of military age in terms of literacy and wealth. I will use information
4. The data were collected as part of the NIA funded project, Early Indicators of Later
Work Levels, Disease and Death (P01AG10120), Robert Fogel, PI. The data are available at
http://www.cpe.uchicago.edu.
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from the 1860 census on personal property ownership, literacy, and mari-
tal status and from the 1900 census on place of residence and occupation.
I used the published tables from the 1900 census to obtain information on
population of the incorporated place. I also use the linkage to the 1880
census done by Costa and Kahn (2007). This linkage only uses informa-
tion in the military service records.5 I added population on city of resi-
dence from the published tables of the 1880 census.
I restrict my analyses to men with complete wartime information on
desertion, death, and discharge, leaving me with 34,941 men. When exam-
ining the effects of rank on mortality, I restrict the sample to the 27,545
men with complete date information on all rank changes and who were
not commissioned officers when they joined the company. When I exam-
ine men in 1880 and 1900, I am using 5464 and 10,756 observations,
respectively.6
My analysis of the effectiveness of leading from the front uses the 300
companies for whom I have information on the regimental battlefield
mortality rate of officers and enlistment men from Dyer’s A
Compendium of the War of the Rebellion. I calculated company desertion
rates, the fraction of the company dead from wounds, the fraction of the
company dead of disease, the fraction of the company who were volun-
teers, the coefficient of variation of age for the company, company occu-
pational fragmentation, company birth place fragmentation, and the
mean 1860 percent vote for Lincoln in the county of enlistment using
individual level data on the 34,941 men.
Table 1 shows variable means for all 34,941 men (or those linked to the
censuses) by highest rank achieved. The literate, the native-born, profes-
sionals or proprietors and artisans, volunteers, and those who volunteered
earlier are more likely to become officers. Those who became commis-
sioned officers are less likely to have died during the war but this may
simply be because only those who survived longer were at risk of being
commissioned. After the war, officers were more likely to be professional
or proprietors and were living in larger cities.
5. Results
5.1 Creating Leaders
Table 2 shows that the more able were more likely to become officers, that
is, men who were more literate and men who were either professionals or
proprietors or artisans. Professionals and proprietors were more than
eight and a half times as likely as farmers to become commissioned officers
and almost five times as likely to become sergeants. Artisans were roughly
two and a half times as likely as farmers to become either commissioned
5. For a discussion of linkage rates see Costa and Kahn (2007).
6. More men are linked to the 1900 census than to the 1880 census because using the
pension information leads to a better match.
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officers or sergeants. The tall were more likely to become officers, as were
the native-born. The native-born were almost twice as likely as nonnatives
to become commissioned officers. Size of city of enlistment did not matter.
Volunteer status predicted becoming a corporal but was not a statistically
significant predictor of being promoted to either sergeant or officer.
Controlling for year of enlistment and other characteristics of men at
enlistment, having the regiment be under fire in the past was a statistically
significant predictor of promotion. Being under fire in the past month
predicted promotion to sergeant and corporal and being under fire 2
Table 2. Odds Ratio of Probability of Promotion
Time (in months) until
Commissioned
Officer Sergeant Corporal
Regimental casualties current month 1.002 1.001 0.998
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
Regimental casualties 1 month ago 1.005 1.014*** 1.014***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Regimental casualties 2 months ago 1.012*** 0.0984* 0.988
(0.003) (0.008) (0.009)
Regimental casualties 3 months ago 0.989
(0.014)
Age at muster 1.029** 0.992 0.985*
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
Height in inches 1.124*** 1.153*** 1.066***
(0.035) (0.027) (0.024)
Dummy¼ 1 if has personal property in 1860 1.169 0.876 0.751*
(0.356) (0.155) (0.115)
Dummy¼ 1 if illiterate 0.000*** 0.318* 0.474
(0.000) (0.208) (0.224)
Dummy¼ 1 if Native-born 1.806* 1.098 1.357*
(0.585) (0.192) (0.224)
Dummy¼ 1 if volunteer 1.253 1.188 2.268*
(0.684) (0.631) (1.117)
Logarithm (population in city of enlistment) 0.944 0.948 0.981
(0.060) (0.040) (0.038)
Dummy¼ 1 if at enlistment farmer Professional
or proprietor
8.671*** 4.951*** 1.123
(2.164) (0.945) (0.265)
Artisan 2.344*** 2.512*** 1.774***
(0.571) (0.415) (0.240)
Laborer 0.845 1.725*** 1.240
(0.317) (0.332) (0.204)
Number of men 27,545 26,879 25,837
Number of promotions 122 295 446
The sample is restricted to men with complete information on all rank changes and dates of rank changes. Standard
errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company level. Additional control variables include enlistment
year dummies, a dummy for volunteer status, a dummy for unknown occupation, and a dummy indicating linkage to
the 1860 census. See equation 1 in the text.
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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months ago predicted promotion to commissioned officer, probably
because of the time it took to obtain a commission.
Promotion to either commissioned or noncommissioned officer lowered
the overall odds of death relative to a private, controlling for height, per-
sonal property ownership in 1860, literacy in 1860, marital status in 1860,
nativity, occupation at enlistment, year of enlistment, age at muster, vol-
unteer status, and population in city of enlistment.7 Relative to a private,
the odds of death from a hazard model were 0.888 (^ ¼ 0:061) for a cor-
poral, 0.824 (^ ¼ 0:070) for a sergeant, and 0.181 (^ ¼ 0:057) for a com-
missioned officer. Promotion to corporal or sergeant lowered the odds of
death relative to a private from disease but raised the odds of death from
wounds to 1.216 (^ ¼ 0:122) for a corporal and to 1.347 (^ ¼ 0:149) for a
sergeant. The risk of death for a commissioned officer relative to a private
was lower for both causes of death. The estimated duration dependence
parameter for the Weibull used in the estimation, p, was 0.924 (^ ¼ 0:018)
for death from disease and 1.191 (^ ¼ 0:045) for death in battle, implying
that men’s risk of death from disease fell with their time in the army
(perhaps as they developed immunities) but that their risk of death from
wounds rose.
Conditional on being a sergeant or a commissioned officer, the only
individual characteristic that predicted survivorship was occupation.
Sergeants and commissioned officers who had been laborers at enlistment
were less likely to die than farmers or artisans but were not statistically
distinguishable from professionals and proprietors. It is certainly possible
that both capable and incapable leaders died in the war—the capable who
led by example and the incapable who put themselves in needless danger.
If the least capable on unobservables survived, I will underestimate the
effect of being a leader on later outcomes. In contrast, if the most capable
survived, I will overestimate.
5.2 Leader Effectiveness
Although on average commissioned officers did not imperil themselves in
battle, when they did, it was an effective strategy in creating a cohesive
fighting unit. At the regiment level, the mean ratio of officers to enlisted
men killed was 0.169 with a standard deviation of 0.333. Company deser-
tion rates, which averaged 11%, were lower for companies in which the
regimental battlefield mortality of commissioned officers relative to en-
listed men was higher (see Table 3), controlling for the fraction of men in
the company dying of wounds and disease. The results persist when I
7. Estimates are from a Weibull hazard models of months until death from muster
hðtÞ ¼ h0ðtÞ expðcðCorporalÞ+sðSergeantÞ+oðCommissioned OfficerÞ+xXÞ
where h0ðtÞ is the baseline hazard. Men who desert, become POWs, or are discharged are
treated as censored. I examine both time until death from all causes and time until death from
disease and wounds. My regressions for wounds also control for whether or not an officer
position was a front-line position (e.g., a quarter-master was not).
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control for proxies for commitment to the cause such as the strength of the
vote for Lincoln in the county of enlistment or volunteer status and for
proxies for cohesiveness such as the coefficient of variation of age, occu-
pational fragmentation, and birth place fragmentation (see the last two
columns).8 A standard deviation increase in the mean ratio of officers to
enlisted men killed would have lowered desertion rates by 0.014. In con-
trast, desertion rates would have fallen by 0.008 with a standard deviation
increase in the fraction of the company who were volunteers, by 0.012 with
a standard deviation decrease in birthplace fragmentation, by 0.033 with a
standard deviation increase in the percent of the county voting for
Lincoln, and by 0.044 with a standard deviation decrease in occupational
fragmentation. I find no evidence of nonlinearities in the effect of the ratio
of officers to enlisted men killed on desertion rates (results not shown).
When I control for mean age, the coefficient is insignificant and does not
affect the coefficients on the other variables (results not shown). The ratio
of deaths from disease of officers relative to enlisted men had no effect on
desertion rates (see the second column of Table 3), either because sick men
could not desert or because the connection between officers’ better food
and quarters and their lower risk of death from disease was not well
known.
5.3 Are Leaders in Larger Cities?
In 1880 former sergeants and commissioned officers were more likely to be
in cities of 25,000 or more relative to privates (see Table 4), controlling for
characteristics at enlistment, including enlistment occupation and size of
city of enlistment. A former sergeant was 1.7 times as likely as a former
private to be in a city of 25,000 or more, whereas a former commissioned
officer was 2.8 times as likely. The difference between corporals and ser-
geants was statistically significant at the 7% level and the difference be-
tween corporals and officers was statistically significant at less than the
1% level. There was no statistically significant difference between ser-
geants and commissioned officers. When I look at the combined category
of former sergeant or commissioned officer, these men were twice as likely
to be in a city of 25,000 or more. When I control for occupation in 1880,
these men were still 1.9 times as likely to be in a city of 25,000 or more. If I
include regiment fixed effects, I lose half of the sample, but obtain similar
results with derivatives of 0.003 (^ ¼ 0:016), 0.034 (^ ¼ 0:018), and
0.120 (^ ¼ 0:044) of the probit coefficients on corporal, sergeant, and
officer, respectively. When I restrict the sample men who did not have
severe wounds (about 70% of the sample), the coefficient on the combined
category of sergeant or commissioned officer falls from 0.032 to 0.020
(^ ¼ 0:010). The political connections of officers are not a likely explan-
ation for my results. When I dropped all men who were in identifiable
8. See Costa andKahn (2003) for the effects of company characteristics on desertion rates
and details on how the fragmentation indices were calculated.
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government jobs (less than 1% of the sample), the derivatives of the probit
coefficient in Table 4 remain unchanged at 0.001 (^ ¼ 0:009), 0.023
(^ ¼ 0:010), and 0.060 (^ ¼ 0:023) for corporals, sergeants, and officers,
respectively.
Former sergeants and commissioned officers were not just more likely
than former privates to be in large cities; they were also more likely to be in
intermediate size cities. They were twice as likely as former privates to be
in cities of 25,000 or more and 1.2–1.7 times as likely to be in cities of
2500–24,999 (see Table 4).
Former sergeants and commissioned officers were more likely to have
moved across counties between 1860 and 1880 (results not shown). The
fraction of county movers was 0.59 and being a former sergeant raised the
probability of a move relative to a private by 0.055 (^ ¼ 0:031). Being a
former commissioned officer raised the probability of a move by 0.102
Table 4. Wartime Rank (Relative to Private) and Size of City of Residence in 1880
Probit ordered probit
City of >25,000 Odds ratios
City population
@P
@X Odds
ratio
>25,000 2500–
24,999
Difference
1. Probit
Corporal 0.002 1.046
(0.009) (0.245)
Sergeant 0.023*** 1.663***
(0.010) (0.312)
Commissioned officer 0.063*** 2.824***
(0.024) (0.747)
2. Probit
Sergeant or commissioned officer 0.032*** 1.952***
(0.009) (0.303)
With occupation category controls
Sergeant or commissioned officer 0.019*** 1.911***
(0.006) (0.360)
3. Ordered probit
Sergeant or commissioned officer 2.093*** 1.682*** 0.410***
(0.292) (0.173) (0.127)
With occupation category controls
Sergeant or commissioned officer 2.127*** 1.216*** 0.910***
(0.355) (0.411) (0.332)
The sample consists of the 5464 men linked to the 1880 census. See equations 3, 4, and 5 in the text. Standard
errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company level. The specifications control for height at enlistment,
dummies for personal property ownership, literacy, and marital status in 1860, nativity dummies (Britain, Ireland,
Germany, other foreign, with United States as the omitted category), occupation at enlistment dummies (professional
or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the omitted category), enlistment year dummies, age at
muster, a dummy for volunteer status, a dummy for population size in city of enlistment, and a dummy indicating
linkage to the 1860 census.
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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(^ ¼ 0:052). Conditional on being a county mover, there was not a stat-
istically significant relationship between distance moved and wartime rank
and the sign of the coefficient on former commissioned officer implies that
former officers were less likely to move long distances. Former sergeants
were statistically significantly more likely to have moved across states but
not former commissioned officers. The results are consistent with a move
to large cities rather than with a westward migration.
Examining size of city of residence and wartime rank in 1900 yields
similar but slightly attenuated results (see Table 5), controlling for enlist-
ment characteristics and 1880 occupation. Corporals, sergeants, and com-
missioned officers were more likely to be in a city of 25,000 or more
relative to privates. Although the magnitude of the effect is bigger for
commissioned officers, there was no statistical difference between cor-
porals, sergeants, and commissioned officers. For the combined category
of former sergeant or commissioned officer, these men were 1.3 times as
likely to be in city of 25,000 or more relative to privates. They were 1.2
times as likely to be in a city of 2500–24,999. When I omitted 1880 occu-
pation as a control, I obtained very similar results. For example, the de-
rivatives on corporal, sergeant, and officers were 0.023 (^ ¼ 0:011), 0.026
(^ ¼ 0:012), and 0.056 (^ ¼ 0:024), respectively.
Former sergeants and commissioned officers were more likely to be
professionals or proprietors in 1880 and 1900, and former corporals
were also more likely to be professionals or proprietors circa 1900 (see
Table 6). Men in the combined category of former sergeant or commis-
sioned officer were 1.7–1.8 times as likely to be professionals or propri-
etors relative to privates.
In both 1880 and 1900, having been a sergeant or commissioned officer
raised a veteran’s probability of (1) living in a city of 2500 or more and
being a professional or proprietor, (2) living in city of 2500 or more and
not being a professional or proprietor, and (3) not living in city of 2500 or
more and being a professional or proprietor (results not shown). Relative
to the mean probability of living in a city of 2500 or more and being a
professional or proprietor, having been a former sergeant or commis-
sioned officer roughly doubled the joint probability of living in a city of
2500 or more and being a professional or proprietor.9
Cities may have provided training opportunities for the able. (Because
of sorting on ability, a random veteran would not necessarily benefit from
being in a city.) Veterans who were in a city of 2500 or more in 1880 and
9. Results are from multinomial logit models for both 1880 and 1900 in which my cate-
gories are (1) in a city of 2500 or more and a professional or proprietor; (2) in a city of 2500
and not a professional or proprietor; (3) not in a city of 2500 and a professional or proprietor;
and (4) not in city of 2500 or more and not a professional or proprietor. That is, I estimate
PrðCategoryiÞ ¼ soðSergeant or Commissioned OfficerÞ+xX
where X is in an indicator of a vector of pre-enlistment and enlistment demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics.
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were not professionals or proprietors in 1880 were more likely to be pro-
fessionals and proprietors in 1900 (see Table 7). Conditional on being a
private or corporal, the probability in a probit regression of being a pro-
fessional or a proprietor in 1900 rose by 0.051 if the veteran was in a city of
at least 2500 and was not a professional or proprietor in 1880 compared to
the probability for a veteran of not being in a city of at least 2500 and not
being a professional or proprietor in 1880. Conditional on being a ser-
geant or an officer, the respective probability was 0.127.
The movement of officers to large cities did not lead former privates and
corporals to follow them (results not shown). The 298 former sergeants or
commissioned officers in cities or boroughs in 1900 were more likely to be
in city of 25,000 or more if there was a fellow officer in that same city (the
derivative of the probit coefficient was 0.366 with a standard error of
0.091), but the number of former privates or corporals did not predict
former sergeants and officers being in a large city. In contrast, the 1661
former privates or corporals in cities in 1900 were more likely to be in city
of >25,000 if there was an enlisted man in that city (the derivative on the
probit coefficient was 0.327 with a standard error of 0.039) but not if there
was a former sergeant or officer in that city.
Table 5. Wartime Rank (Relative to Private) and Size of City of Residence in 1900
Probit Ordered probit
City of >25,000 Odds ratios City
population
@P
@X Odds
ratio
>25,000 2500–
24,999
Difference
1. Probit
Corporal 0.024** 1.227**
(0.011) (0.107)
Sergeant 0.025** 1.236**
(0.012) (0.115)
Commissioned officer 0.054*** 1.508**
(0.024) (0.232)
2. Probit
Sergeant or commissioned
officer
0.031*** 1.286***
(0.011) (0.106)
3. Ordered probit
Sergeant or commissioned
officer
1.335*** 1.162** 0.174***
(0.090) (0.044) (0.050)
The sample consists of the 10,756 men linked to the 1900 census. See equations 3, 4, and 5 in the text. Standard
errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company level. The specifications control for height at enlistment,
dummies for personal property ownership, literacy, and marital status in 1860, nativity dummies (Britain, Ireland,
Germany, other foreign, with United States as the omitted category), occupation at enlistment dummies (professional
or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the omitted category), enlistment year dummies, age at
muster, a dummy for volunteer status, a dummy for population size in city of enlistment, 1880 occupation dummies
(professional or proprietor, artisan, and laborer, with farmer as the omitted category), and dummies indicating
linkage to the 1860 and 1880 censuses.
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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5.4 Are Leaders Born or Created?
I obtain mixed evidence on whether leaders are born or created (see
Table 8). I classified men into those who would have been promoted to
sergeant or commissioned officer prior to the end of the war with no
casualties and into those who were promoted only with casualties
(based on a regression similar to those in Table 2). The latter group con-
stitutes the majority of promotions—587 out of 767 in 1880. I then esti-
mated probit regressions of being in a city of 25,000 or more and of being a
professional or proprietor in 1880 and in 1900. Regardless of why they
were promoted, sergeants and commissioned officers were statistically sig-
nificantly more likely than privates and corporals to be in a city of at least
25,000 and to be professionals or proprietors in either 1880 or 1900.
Although a comparison of the point estimates of the on promotion
types suggests leaders entered the army as leaders, the derivatives are
only statistically significantly different from each other when I look at
who was in a city of 25,000 or more in 1880.
I also used a regression similar to those in Table 2 to identify men who
missed being promoted because casualty rates did not reach the 90th per-
centile. I could identify 27 such men in 1880 and 43 such men in 1900.
When I compared the city size choice of these men to men who had been
promoted using a probit similar to equation 4, I obtained derivatives on
the men who had missed promotion and on the combined category of
sergeant and officer of 0.013 (^ ¼ 0:021) and 0.033 (^ ¼ 0:009) in 1880
and 0.076 (^ ¼ 0:024) and 0.033 (^ ¼ 0:011) in 1900. Although the de-
rivatives are statistically significantly different from each other only in
1900, one potential explanation for the negative sign on men who
Table 7. City Size and Occupation Choice in 1880 and Occupational Status in 1900
Dependent variable: Professional
or proprietor in 1900
Private or
corporal
Sergeant or
commissioned
officer
@P
@X
@P
@X
City of >2500 and professional/proprietor in 1880 0.397*** 0.440***
(0.062) (0.094)
City of >2500 and not professional/proprietor in 1880 0.051* 0.127*
(0.030) (0.076)
Not city of >2500 and professional/proprietor in 1880 0.385*** 0.468***
(0.030) (0.056)
Mean p 0.148 0.297
Observations 2932 501
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.127
The sample consists of all 3433 men linked across the 1880 and 1900 censuses. The omitted category is not in a
city of >2500 and not a professional/proprietor in 1880. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the
company level. All specifications control for age at enlistment.
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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missed promotion is that there were unobservable characteristics such that
these men were not leadership material.
On the whole I interpret the available evidence as suggesting that, at
least in the long-run, leaders are created. However, because other hypoth-
eses could explain the findings, the results are suggestive only. I therefore
tentatively explain my post-war mobility results as largely due to training.
Although wartime promotion might reveal information on who was a
leader, my findings on leaders as generalists (see below) suggest that it
was not just promotion per se that mattered but also the number of tasks
performed.
Table 8. Wartime Rank of Sergeant or Commissioned Officer (Relative to Private or
Corporal) by Promotion Status and Size of City of Residence and Socioeconomic
Status in 1880 and 1900
@P
@X Odds ratio
1. City of 25,000+ in 1880
Promoted only with wartime casualties 0.020*** 1.579**
(0.075) (0.291)
Promoted without wartime casualties 0.075*** 3.194***
(0.024) (0.813)
p-value, difference coefficients 0.019
2. City of 25,000+ in 1900
Promoted only with wartime casualties 0.021* 1.197***
(0.012) (0.112)
Promoted without wartime casualties 0.055* 1.515**
(0.022) (0.214)
p-value, difference coefficients 0.142
3. Professional or proprietor in 1880
Promoted only with wartime casualties 0.077*** 1.673***
(0.018) (0.175)
Promoted without wartime casualties 0.114*** 1.993***
(0.034) (0.317)
p-value, difference coefficients 0.344
4. Professional or proprietor in 1900
Promoted only with wartime casualties 0.081*** 1.630***
(0.014) (0.122)
Promoted without wartime casualties 0.110*** 1.852***
(0.022) (0.185)
p-value, difference coefficients 0.257
The samples consist of the 5464 men linked to the 1880 census and the 10,756 men linked to the 1900 census. See
equation 8 in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company level. The specifications
control for height at enlistment, dummies for personal property ownership, literacy, and marital status in 1860,
nativity dummies (Britain, Ireland, Germany, other foreign, with United States as the omitted category), occupation
at enlistment dummies (professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the omitted cat-
egory), enlistment year dummies, age at muster, a dummy for volunteer status, a dummy for population size in city
of enlistment, and a dummy indicating linkage to the 1860 census. The 1900 specifications control for 1880 occu-
pation dummies (professional or proprietor, artisan, and laborer, with farmer as the omitted category) and a dummy
indicating linkage to the 1880 census.
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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5.5 Leaders as Generalists
There is suggestive evidence that sergeants and officers with more than
strict military tasks while in the army were more likely to be in a city of
25,000 or more in 1880 (see Table 9), consistent with Lazear’s (2010)
theory of leaders as generalists. I classified different tasks as being a quar-
ter-master, being on recruiting duty, being a clerk, being a nurse, and so on
if a veteran was ever in a front-line position. I do not consider being on
guard duty a different type of task nor do I consider a promotion to be a
different type of task. The point estimates for both 1880 and 1900 imply
that while any sergeant or officer was more likely to be in a large city
compared to privates and corporals, sergeants and officers with more than
one type of duty were more likely to be in a large city than those with only
one type of duty. However, the difference in the point estimates on
number of duties was statistically significant only for 1880. When I exam-
ined the separate categories of corporals, sergeants, and officers, I found
that relative to privates sergeants with only one type of task had only a
0.014 (^ ¼ 0:012) greater probability of being in a large city in 1880, but
those with more than one task had a 0.079 (^ ¼ 0:034) greater probability.
Commissioned officers with only one type of task had a 0.056 (^ ¼ 0:037)
greater probability of being in a large city compared to one of 0.156
(^ ¼ 0:077) for officers with more than one type of task. Having more
than one type of task may proxy not for being a generalist but having for
the chance to acquire skills that were more transferable to the private
sector (Lee 2007). When I classified the combined category of sergeants
or commissioned officers as having one, two, and three or more tasks,
I found suggestive but not statistically significant evidence of decreasing
returns in 1880 and of increasing returns in 1900 (see Table 9).
My results rule out greater army pay rather than leadership skills lead-
ing men to move to cities in 1880. Although I cannot rule this out in 1900,
in the long-run the difference in the number of tasks performed during the
war may have mattered less than civilian experience.
6. Conclusion
The Civil War provides researchers a unique opportunity to identify war-
time leaders. By observing both leaders and followers during the war and
40 years after it, I established that the most able became wartime leaders,
that leading by example from the front was an effective strategy in redu-
cing desertion rates, and that leaders later migrated to the larger cities
because this is where their superior skills would have had the highest
payoffs. Although my findings on whether leaders are born or created
are mixed, on the whole my results suggest that leaders are created. My
findings support theories of leadership based on personnel economics such
as those of Lazear (2010) in a completely different context and with a
much longer term follow-up than is usual with modern firm data.
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My findings also have implications for the growth of US cities. The
literature on internal migration has emphasized the westward movement,
but at the same time that the population was moving westward the share
of the urban population (those living in a city of at least 2500) rose from
20% to 40% between 1860 and 1900. Cities were magnets for the most
able (the leaders). They also provided training opportunities for both
leaders and followers: men might start in a low social status occupation
in a city but then move to a higher status occupation.
Appendix
Civil War regiments and companies were organized as follows:
REGIMENT (¼10 Companies)
Commander: Colonel
Staff positions:
Lieutenant Colonel, Major, Adjutant (1st Lieutenant), Surgeon (Major)
Table 9. Number of Military Duties and Size of City of Residence in 1880 and 1900
City of 25,000 in
1880 1900
@P
@X
@P
@X
1.
Sergeant or commissioned officer, one duty (0.012)* 0.029***
(0.009) (0.012)
Sergeant or commissioned officer, more than one duty 0.053*** 0.049**
(0.021) (0.026)
p-value, difference between coefficients on number of duties 0.035 0.478
2.
Sergeant or commissioned officer, one duty 0.018* 0.029***
(0.011) (0.012)
Sergeant or commissioned officer, two duties 0.106*** 0.035
(0.037) (0.027)
Sergeant or commissioned officer, three or more duties 0.062 0.103*
(0.056) (0.072)
p-value, difference between coefficients on one duty and
two duties
0.004 0.858
p-value, difference between coefficients on one duty and
three or more duties
0.371 0.258
p-value, difference between coefficients on two duties and
three or more duties
0.539 0.335
The samples consist of the 5464 men linked to the 1880 census and the 10,756 men linked to the 1900 census. See
equations 9 and 10 in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company level. The
specifications control for height at enlistment, dummies for personal property ownership, literacy, and marital status
in 1860, nativity dummies (Britain, Ireland, Germany, other foreign, with United States as the omitted category),
occupation at enlistment dummies (professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the
omitted category), enlistment year dummies, age at muster, a dummy for volunteer status, a dummy for population
size in city of enlistment, and a dummy indicating linkage to the 1860 census.
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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Assistant Surgeon (Captain), Quartermaster (Lieutenant), Commissary
(Lieutenant)
Sergeant-Major, Quartermaster Sergeant
COMPANY (¼100 men¼ 2 platoons¼ 4 sections¼ 8 squads)
Commander: Captain
1st Lieutenant, commanded one platoon if company divided into
platoons (the captain ran the other)
2nd Lieutenant
1st Sergeant, “ran” whole company
4 Sergeants, one for each section
8 Corporals, one for each squad
Privates
2 musicians
Noncommissioned officers are corporals and sergeants. Ranks of
lieutenant and higher are commissioned officers.
Source: http://www.angelfire.com/wv/wasec5/formations.html
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